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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah R. 
App. P. and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The legal issue presented for review is one of first impres-
sion in the State of Utah: Should a landlord who serves a notice 
to pay rent or quit upon its tenant when the tenant is not in 
default of its rental obligations be held responsible for damages 
sustained by the tenant who vacates the premises pursuant to the 
notice to quit? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Only one question of law is on review in this case. The 
appropriate standard of review is that where the issue on appeal 
is one of law, the appellate court need not accord any deference 
to the trial court's view of the law. See, e.g., Ron Case 
Roofing and Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
1989) . 
CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Citations to the record herein will be as follows: "R" 
followed by the page number in the record where the reference can 
be located. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of 
Utah. The case arose from the following background. Plaintiff 
was leasing property from defendant to operate an antique shop in 
Salt Lake City. R. at 157. Defendant served upon plaintiff a 
three-day notice to pay rent or quit on November 20, 1991. R. at 
159. The notice to quit was served despite the fact that no rent 
was due at the time. R. at 148. It is plaintiff's position that 
it had pre-paid rent through December 21, 1991. R. at 158 and 
159. It is undisputed that no rent was due as of November 20, 
1991 when the notice to quit was served. See, e.g., R. at pp. 70 
and 71. In response to the notice to quit, plaintiff began 
vacating the premises by removing inventory. R. at 256. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the notice to quit 
constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction; that it would 
not have left the premises when it did if the notice had not been 
served; that it suffered damages as a result of the wrongful 
eviction and that punitive damages should be assessed against 
defendant. See R. at pp. 1 - 5 . 
B. Course of Proceeding and Disposition 
A motion for summary judgment was filed by defendant argu-
ing, inter alia, that the service of a notice to pay rent or quit 
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upon a tenant who is not in default in its rental obligation 
cannot constitute a wrongful eviction. The court ultimately 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment expressly ruling 
that a notice to pay rent or quit cannot, without more, consti-
tute a wrongful eviction even though the rent may have been paid, 
since the eviction notice sets forth alternatives (i.e.. pay rent 
or leave the premises within three days) and it was plaintiff who 
chose to vacate the premises. R. at pp. 340 and 341. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Due to the court's summary judgment which was based upon its 
interpretation of the law rather than an evaluation of facts, the 
basic facts relevant for this appeal appear to be as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was leasing the subject property from defen-
dant to conduct a retail business. R. at p. 157. 
2. On November 20, 1991, plaintiff was served with a 
three-day notice to pay rent or quit. R. at p. 159. 
A true and correct copy of the notice to pay rent or quit is 
included in the appendix hereto. 
3. At the time the notice to pay rent or quit was served, 
there was no rent due and owing. R. at pp. 158 and 159. (It is 
plaintiff's position that rent had been paid through December 21, 
1991. R. at pp. 158 and 159.) 
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4. In response to the notice to quit, plaintiff immedi-
ately began moving its inventory from the premises in order to 
comply with the notice to quit (R. at p. 256) and suffered 
damages as set forth in its complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Service of a notice to pay rent or quit upon a tenant who 
has already paid rent and is not in breach of its rental obliga-
tions constitutes a constructive or wrongful eviction if the 
tenant responds to the three-day notice to quit by vacating the 
premises. A landlord should not be permitted to escape responsi-
bility when it wrongfully serves a notice to quit and the tenant 
reacts to that notice to its detriment. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's traditional definition of constructive evic-
tion, such an eviction occurs when a tenant's right of possession 
and enjoyment of the leased premises is interfered with by the 
landlord so as to render the premises or part thereof unsuitable 
for the purposes intended. See Brugger v. Fonoti. 645 P.2d 647 
(Utah 1982). "The whole point of Constructive eviction' is that 
the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the land-
lord's action or inaction . . .fl Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P. 2d 140, 
142 (Utah App. 1992) 
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The issue in this case is one of first impression in Utah: 
Should a landlord who serves a notice to pay rent or quit upon a 
tenant be excused of liability for damages sustained by the 
tenant who vacates the premises pursuant to the notice to quit 
when the tenant is not in default of its rental obligations• 
Plaintiff submits that a landlord should be held liable. Howev-
er, the trial court in this case ruled, as a matter of law, that 
plaintiff had no constructive eviction claim against defendant. 
The court held that because the notice to pay rent or vacate 
gives the tenant alternative courses of action ((1) stay and pay 
rent or (2) vacate), defendant was not liable for constructive 
eviction. 
The fundamental questions to be analyzed in this case is as 
follows: As between the landlord and tenant, who should bear the 
risk of an improper notice to quit? Plaintiff submits it is 
consistent with sound public policy to make the landlord bear the 
risk. Otherwise, the tenant is forced to make the choice of 
either (1) staying on the premises and hoping that it is correct 
in believing that the rent has been paid, or (2) leaving the 
premises in order to avoid the threats of the three day notice 
(treble damages, costs, attorney's fees and forced eviction). In 
either event, the tenant is forced to make a determination due to 
the conduct of the landlord and suffers the consequences of 
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making the wrong choice. A tenant should not be faced with such 
a dilemma. 
Perhaps this issue can be analogized to tort law principals. 
General tort law has long recognized that one who sets in motion 
the forces which cause the harm will beheld responsible. See 
Armory Park Neighborhood Assn'n v. Episcopal Community Serv. in 
Ariz.. 712 P.2d 914, 920 (Ariz. 1985). See also State Nat'l. 
Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 691 (Tex. App. 8th Dist. 
1984) (where damage has resulted from a wrongful act which is the 
original cause of an event, in that such event is a part of a 
chain of events set in motion by a party, such party may be held 
responsible for the total results) (citations omitted). 
This same rationale should apply to a landlord who wrong-
fully or negligently serves a three-day notice to pay rent or 
quit upon a tenant who is not in breach of its obligation to pay 
rent. The landlord sets events in motion by serving the notice 
to quit. The notice itself tells the tenant to get out in order 
to avoid a parade of horribles (forced eviction, treble damages, 
attorney's fees and costs). The defense that the tenant was 
unreasonable in choosing the alternative to vacate the premises 
is not compelling. Tenants may be inexperienced, uneducated, 
unsophisticated or financially unable to seek legal help when 
served with a notice to quit. The language of a notice to quit 
can be very threatening and intimidating. Therefore, it is 
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clearly foreseeable that a tenant may vacate the premises pursu-
ant to a notice to quit even when there has been no breach to 
justify a notice to quit. 
The law should place the risk on the landlord who serves an 
improper notice to pay rent or quit. It makes no sense for the 
tenant to pay for a landlord's negligent mistake, or even worse, 
intentional wrongful conduct. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that on November 20, 
1991, plaintiff was served with a notice to pay rent or quit 
despite the fact that no rent was then due and owing. Plaintiff 
argues that such conduct should be considered a basis for a claim 
of constructive eviction. Case law from other jurisdictions 
lends support to plaintiff's claim that notices to pay rent or 
quit provide a basis for a claim of constructive eviction. See 
Dobbins v. Paul, 321 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. App. 1984) (When a wrongful 
demand or notice to quit or vacate leased premises is made by a 
lessor or landlord and it is followed by immediate surrender of 
possession by the lessee or tenant, a constructive eviction has 
been accomplished). See also Routal Corp., N.W., Inc. v. Ottati. 
391 So.2d 308 (Fla. App. 1980). 
Plaintiff submits that Utah law should likewise provide a 
cause of action for constructive eviction when notices to pay 
rent or quit are served when there is no rent due and owing. A 
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standard that permits a claim for constructive eviction based on 
a wrongful notice to quit is consistent with sound public policy. 
This court, if it upholds the trial court's ruling, will 
send a message to landlords that they can harass, intimidate, 
manipulate and threaten their tenants with notices to pay rent or 
quit even if the tenants are not in breach of their rental 
obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests 
this Court to rule that the trial court erred in holding a notice 
to quit, without more, cannot constitute constructive eviction, 
even when the rent has been paid and there is no rent due and 
owing. This Court should hold that service of a notice to pay 
rent or quit when rent is not due constitutes a constructive or 
wrongful eviction. Furthermore, the order of the trial court 
requiring plaintiff to pay costs should be reversed. 
DATED this h day of February, 1994. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Donald J. Winder 
Robert D. Tingey 
John W. Holt 
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APPENDIX 
Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate Exhibit A 
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SQUIRE AHTIQUES/Ar* OICX BARTOW AS CALITORMIA PACKAGING 
526 CAST 300 SOOTn 
SALT LAJOB CITY, UTAH 84102 
Yog art htrtby nottfitd that you art In default lor non-ptymtnt of rtnt for tht prtmteae occuplad by 
you at tht address shown ebovt. 
You ar.t furthtr notlfltd that you art to do ona of tha following: 
1. WITHIN THREE OAYS aftar sarvica of thti notlct upon you, you art hartby rtqulrad to pay In full 
tht rtni now owing on Iht pramiaaa at Iht abova addrass. which you now occupy, 
Th* total rt«» dut »a t3,500.00
 ; t)9tng rtnl for tht period(S) commencing IS wov. 1991 t en0« tndlng 
* . payaoit monthly m advance, computed at tha rata of % * . ptr month, 
plua a lata f t t of $ 2 5 0 - 0 0 par month, amounting to tht sum of $3,750.00 j 0 S , j ^ _ 
paid on account to data; 2 0 H * v - l 9 9 1 - AND AS PER TOUR OFT IC IAL NOTICE, TAXED TODAY, MOW 
ATTACHED AND A PART CT THIS NOTICE. 
OR 
2. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO VACATE SAIO PREMISES WITHIN THREE OAYS and surrtnder 
possession of said premises with keys to the undersigned Owner or his duly authorized sgjnt. 
IN THE EVENT of your failure to pay the said rent or to vacate tha said premises within such period of 
THREE OAYS. you will be unlawfully detaining possession of sa»d oremijes. In accordance with the 
provmoni o' Sectton 78-36« *0. Utah Codt Annotated. '953. you w»» be liable lor treble damages for sucn 
unlawful deta'n«r. i^o action will be con ,m«nced aqamst you lo evict you ''om said oremues and to take 
|udgment agamjt you lor the rent accrued o'us damages oi three limes Ihe rent lor the oeriod you are 
unlawfully detaining possession of said premises, together with any damages to said premises, court costs, 
and attorney s lees. 
Pltaat Immediately notify tht undersigned of your intentions. 
H.I.H Ihl. *°™ „. y nl HOVtHBCT , . 9 1 
0»-*» m M ^ i t H l ****** V«r»^. | m \ 455^tA3T SOOTH TEMPLE, SUITS 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
(801)363-6811 
MumcJpal ordlnanc?i provide* 
ft tnart bt u«<twM for any Of rion. woon victtino. or rtmonne ''Of" dwtMmoi. Hort 'oomi. or trty otntr building, to fall to rt move 
til car Oioa fuoou". ind «in«t from tucf* &iHdmo i*d 0 ' i n n n md tUo tn« g/ovnd ipotnilning thtrtto, or to (ill to plica isme 
m a Ihoiowgnhr unitary condition J4 nowi iHtr laid p'f •••Mil in«M bt viciitd 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
t certify that service of thte notice waa comoieted In accordance with the provisions of Section 78-30-3 
and Section 78-35-6. Utah Code Annotated, 1953. on (date) ~Z0 f^hHsfi at (place) t^-Lbr? "*&*&>* 
tfc delivering a copy to Ihe tenant oeraonally. OR 
D sending a cooy through certified or registered mail, addrassed to the tenant at his place of residence. 
OR 
O leaving a cooy with a person of suitable age and discretion at tht tenant's 
residence or place of busineai, and by mailing a second copy to the Tenant at said residence, or place of 
buameas, OR 
D affixing a copy In a conaolcuoue place on tht rented premises, afler falling to find anyone there. 
^ £ f a x i n g a c o p y t o OICX BARTON a t CALIFORNIA PACKAGING M 3 1 0 1 6 ? 8 - 0 9 9 8 . 
Subacrlbtd and sworn to before me on this 
residing at 
My flommimon tvpirts A 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this £) day 
of February, 1994, to: 
Richard N. Cannon, Esq. 
56 East Broadway, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
•\ 
2342\mlb\bnef2 «pp 
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